UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-17-2008

State v. Swindle Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34658

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Swindle Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34658" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1946.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1946

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

NO. 34658

1

v.
ABIGAIL M. SWINDLE,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Defendant-Appellant.

1
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

HEATHER M. CARLSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 7148
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................I
Nature of the Case .....................................................................................
I
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................6
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 7
I. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Swindle's
Motion To Suppress Because She Was Unlawfully
Detained Without Reasonable Suspicion ................................................... 7
A. Introduction .......................................................................................... 7
B. Standard Of Review..............................................................................7
C. The District Court Erred When It Found There Was
Reasonable Suspicion To Justify Ms. Swindle's
Detention By The Deputies ................................................................... 8
1. The District Court Correctly Determined That
Ms. Swindle Was Detained By The Deputies .................................. 9

2. Ms. Swindle's Detention Was Unlawful Because
The Deputies Did Not Have A Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion That She Was Involved In
Criminal Activity ............................................................................. I 0
a. The Deputies Lacked An Individualized Suspicion
Specifically Related To Ms. Swindle To Justify Her
Detention..................................................................................

12

b. The State Failed To Establish That The Information
Provided By The Citizen Informants Provided
Reasonable Suspicion.............................................................. 15

D. The Statements And Evidence Obtained As A Result
Of Ms. Swindle's Unlawful Detention Should Be
Suppressed Because They Are The Fruits Of Her
Illegal Detention ................................................................................

I6

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
18
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................
19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972) .............................................................
16
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) ..............................................................
12
9
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)...................................................................

.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) .................................................12 13
Minnesota v. Dickersosn. 508 U.S. 366 (1993) .....................................................8
People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th 354, 902 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1995) ..............................14
11
State v. Bromgard. 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App . 2003.) .......................
State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209. 677 P.2d 522 (1984) .............................................8
State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983) ........................................

9

State v. Gutierrez. 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (2002) .....................................

....8

State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) .........................................7
State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App . 2000) .............................17
State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643. 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App . 2002) ....................... 12, 13
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004) ............................................. 9
State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834. 573 P.2d 153 (1978) ................................................ 9
State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 978 P.2d 212 (1999) ........................................... 9
State v. Schrecengost. 134 Idaho 547, 6 P.3d 403 (Ct. App . 2000) ....................17
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (2001) ..................................... 11
State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613. 930 P.2d 1358 (Ct. App . 1997)............................ 11
State v. Silva. 134 Idaho 848. 11 P.3d 44 (2000).................................................. 8
State v. Worthington. 138 Idaho 470. 65 P.3d 21 1 (Ct. App . 2002) ...................... 8

iii

State v. Zapafa.Reyes. 144 Idaho 703. 169 P.3d 291 (2007).............................16
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 ( I968) ........................................................................... 8
U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 ( I 976).....................................................
12
8
Unifed States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 41 1 (1981) .......................................................

Wilson v. ldaho Transportation Department, 436 ldaho 270. 32 P.3d 164 (Ct.
App . 2001) .......................................................................................................
II

Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963)...............................................17
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend IV ...........................................................................................
8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Abigail Swindle was a visitor in Kristine Bear's home when she was illegally
detained by police officers. After receiving Ms. Bear's consent to look around her
residence, Kootenai County Sheriff's Deputies went to the room Ms. Swindle was in,
escorted her to the living room, obtained her driver's license, and required that she
remain seated in the living room for the duration of the search. A bindle believed to
contain methamphetamine was discovered in the home, those present were questioned
regarding who the bindle belonged to, and Ms. Swindle eventually stated the bindle was
her's.

Ms. Swindle was subsequently arrested and drug paraphernalia and

methamphetamine were found on her person during the search incident to her arrest.
She was eventually charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession
of paraphernalia with intent to use.
Ms. Swindle filed a Motion to Suppress her statements and the evidence seized
pursuant to her arrest as these were all products of her illegal detention. Ms. Swindle
now appeals from the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order in Re:
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. On appeal, Ms. Swindle contends that, although the
district court correctly found that she was detained by the deputies, the district court
erred when it found that there was reasonable suspicion to detain her while the deputies
looked around and subsequently search the residence she was a visitor in. Therefore,
the evidence seized and her statements made should have been suppressed because
they were the products of her illegal detention.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
On March 3, 2007, Ms. Swindle was visiting Kristine Bear at Ms. Bear's
residence in Post Falls, Idaho. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.54, Ls.5-6; R., p.108.) Earlier that day,
Deputies Patrick Meehan and Charles Sciortino of the Kootenai County Sheriff's
Department had received reports from two of Ms. Bear's neighbors stating they were
concerned that there was drug activity occurring in Ms. Bear's home. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.10,
Ls.7-10, p.11, Ls.3-6, p.29, Ls.48-25; R., p.108.) Deputy Meehan had been informed by
one of Ms. Bear's neighbors that the neighbor felt there was drug activity going on at
her residence. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.10, Ls.1-10.) When Deputy Meehan went to Ms. Bear's
home to investigate with Deputy Sciortino, another neighbor informed them that Ms.
Bear was not home, and that he also felt there was drug activity going on at the
residence. (Tr. 6115/07, p.1 I , Ls.2-11.) That neighbor then called the deputies when
Ms. Bear arrived home and the deputies returned to Ms. Bear's residence. (Tr. 6/15/07,
p.1I , Ls.7-I I.)
Ms. Bear allowed the deputies to enter her home and gave her consent for the
deputies to look around.
Exhibits A &

(Tr. 6/15/07, p.12, Ls.6-11, p.31, Ls.7-18; R., pp.108-09;

B.) Deputy Sciortino asked if there was anyone else in the residence and

Ms. Bear informed him that there was one other person in the back room. (Tr.6/15/07,
p.13, Ls.1-6; R., p.109; Exhibits A & B.) He then located Ms. Swindle in the back
bedroom and brought her to the front living room.

(Tr. 6/15/07, p.34, Ls.11-14;

R., p.109.) He also asked Ms. Swindle if there was anyone else in residence, and
Ms. Swindle replied that there was not, believing Deputy Sciortino was referring to the
bedroom she was in.

(Tr. 6/15/07, p.34, Ls.15-18, p.57, Ls.8-12, p.59, Ls.1-12;

R., p.109.) As Deputy Sciortino was escorting Ms. Swindle to the front of the residence,
he noticed a woman hiding in another bedroom.' (Tr. 6/15/07, p.35, Ls.6-10; R., p.109.)
He proceeded to escort both women to the living room, where Ms. Bear, her son, and
Deputy Meehan were located.

(Tr. 6/15/07, p.36, Ls.18-22; R., p.109.)

Deputy

Sciortino then received verbal consent from Ms. Bear to search the residence for drugs.
(Tr. 6/15/07, p.49, Ls.2-9; R., p.109; Exhibits A & B.).
Sometime after Ms. Swindle was escorted to the living room, she asked if she
could go to the bathroom to get a band-aid for her finger. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.42, Ls.8-20;
R., p.109.) Deputy Sciortino advised her she could not, stating they would be done in a
few minutes. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.42, Ls.8-20; R., p.109.)

Deputy Sciortino also advised

Ms. Bear why they were there and received her verbal consent to search the residence.
(Exhibits A & B.) Deputy Meehan then asked for and obtained identification from Ms.
Swindle, as well as the other individuals present, while Deputy Sciortino was searching
the residence. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.21, Ls.14-22; R., p.109; Exhibits A & B.)
While searching the residence, Deputy Sciortino found a tinfoil bindle containing
what he believed to be methamphetamine.' (Tr. 6/15/07, p.38, Ls.19-23, p.39, Ls.2-3,

' This other woman initially gave Deputy Sciortino a false name, but Ms. Bear informed

the deputies of her real name and that she had a warrant out for her arrest.
$Tr. 6/15/07, p.14, Ls.20-22, p.35, L.24 - p.36, L.14; R., p.109; Exhibits A & 8.)
At the hearing on the Ms. Swindle's motion to suppress, both Deputies testified that
the bindle was found near the bathroom sink; although, Deputy Meehan stated his
police report mistakenly stated it was found by the kitchen sink. Tr. 6/15/07, p.38,
Ls.19-23, p.39, Ls.2-3, p.46, L.15 - p.47, L.6; R., p.109.) Notably, in the audio
recordings of the incident, Deputy Sciortino repeatedly states there is a bindle of
methamphetamine "on the kitchen sink rather than in the bathroom. (Exhibits A & B.)
Because Ms. Swindle contends she was detained prior to the bindle being located, the
exact location is not necessary to the issue raised on appeal. Therefore, she is not
disputing where the bindle was found for the purposes of this appeal.

p.46, L.15

- p.47, L.6; R., p.109; Exhibits A & B.)

According to Deputy Sciortino, the

bindie appeared to have recently been used to ingest methamphetamine. (Tr. 6/15/07,
p.38, L.22

- p.39, L.1;

R., p.109.) Deputy Sciortino then returned to the living room,

advised every one of their Miranda rights, and questioned them regarding who the
bindle belonged to. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.39, Ls.7-21, p.47, Ls.3-16, R., p.109; Exhibits A &
B.) He advised them "that somebody was going to admit to the bindle or everybody was
going to be going to jail" and that "he would be performing drug tests on the arrested
persons, but all that could be avoided if someone is honest." (R., pp.109-10; see also
Exhibits A & 8.) At that point, Ms. Swindle stated "'I'll take it. It doesn't matter. I'm not
letting her (presumably Ms. Bear) with kids go to jail."' (R., p.110; Exhibits A & B.) After
Ms. Swindle was admonished not to make a false admission, Ms. Swindle again stated
that she would take responsibility for the bindle. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.40, Ls.4-12; R., p.llO;
Exhibits A & 8.) Ms. Swindle was then arrested. (R. p 0 ) During the search
incident to her arrest, seven pipes were discovered in her pockets and
methamphetamine was discovered in her bra. (R., p.110.) Ms. Swindle was charged
with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to use. (R., pp.16-19, 63-64.)
Ms. Swindle subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress her statements and
evidence seized, including all statements she made in the living room, and all evidence
seized from her person, because she was illegally detained by the deputies and her
statements and the evidence seized were the direct result of that illegal detention.
(R., pp.74-75, 110.)

Following a hearing and briefing on Ms. Swindle's Motion to

Suppress, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in Re:

Defendant's Motion to Suppress denying Ms. Swindle's Motion to Suppress, finding
that, although Ms. Swindle was detained by the deputies, the deputies had a reasonable
suspicion to detain her, and therefore, her detention was not illegal. (R., pp.82-15.)
Ms. Swindle subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance, reserving her right to appeal the district court's denial of her
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.121-25.) The remaining charge was dismissed by the
State pursuant to the plea agreement. (R., pp.132-33.) The district court sentenced

I

I
I
j

I
I

I
f

Ms. Swindle to four years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

1

(R., pp.134-36.) Ms. Swindle filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's

I

Judgment-Retained Jurisdiction Order.

(R., pp.138-41.)

Following the period of

retained jurisdiction, Ms. Swindle was placed on probation for three years. (See

1

Register of Actions available on the ISTARS Judicial Data Repository at

I

,
Although the Order following Ms. Swindle's Retained Jurisdiction was requested by
Ms. Swindle in her Motion to Augment and Suspend filed March 3, 2008, and ordered to
be provided by the Supreme Court on April 4, 2008, a copy has not yet been provided
by the district court. Counsel for Ms. Swindle has again requested a copy of the Order
and will file a motion to augment the record as soon as it is received.

I
i

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Swindle's motion to suppress her
statements made and evidence seized because she was unlawfully detained?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Swindle's Motion To Suppress Because
She Was Unlawfullv Detained Without Reasonable Suspicion
A.

Introduction
In denying Ms. Swindle's Motion to Suppress, the district court found that

Ms. Swindle was detained by the deputies during the search of Ms. Bear's residence;
however, Ms. Swindle's detention was not illegal because the deputies had reasonable
suspicion to detain her. Ms. Swindle contends that, although the district court correctly
found that she was detained by the deputies, the district court erred when it found that
there was reasonable suspicion to detain her while the deputies looked around and
subsequently search the residence she was a visitor in. Therefore, the evidence seized
and her statements made should have been suppressed because they were the
products of her illegal detention.
B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000). When a decision on a motion to

suppress is challenged, the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Found There Was Reasonable Suspicion To
Justifv Ms. Swindle's Detention By The Deputies
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[tlhe right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures ..." U.S. Const. amend IV. Similarly, Article I,
section 17 of the ldaho Constitution also prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Silva, I34 ldaho 848, 852, 11 P.3d 44, 48 (2000). Under the United States and
ldaho Constitutions warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
they fall into one of the "'few specifically established and well delineated exceptions."
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469
U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)). Therefore, the State bears the burden of demonstrating a
warrantless search or seizure falls into an exception to the warrant requirement.
State v. Worthington, 138 ldaho 470,472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002).
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to
investigatory detentions of a person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests.
Stafe v. Gutierrez, 137 ldaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (2002); State v. Knapp, 120
ldaho at 346, 815 P.2d at 1086. Although an arrest of an individual must be based on
probable cause, police may seize a person through an investigatory stop without
probable cause, provided there is a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Knapp, 120 ldaho at 346-47, 815 P.2d at 1085;
Sfafe v. Cook, 106 ldaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (1984). The standard of proof which an
officer must satisfy in order to justify an investigatory stop is to be judged by the "totality
of the circumstances." State v. Haworth, 106 ldaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123; see United
States V. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); State v. Cowen, 104 ldaho 649, 662 P.2d 230

(1983); State v. Post, 98 ldaho 834, 573 P.2d 153 (1978). The State bears the burden
of proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on reasonable suspicion and
is limited in its scope and duration to the issue being investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Gutierrez, 137 ldaho at 651, 51 P.3d at 651. Here, the district
court correctly found that Ms. Swindle was detained by the deputies. However, it erred
when it found there was reasonable suspicion for her detention.
1.

The District Court Correctlv Determined That Ms. Swindle Was Detained
By The Deputies

The district court was correct in finding that Ms. Swindle was in fact detained by
Deputies Meehan and Sciortino.

A seizure occurs when officers detain someone

through physical force or show of authority. State v. Page, 140 ldaho 841, 843, 103
P.3d 454, 456 (2004). To determine if someone has been detained, the courts look at
"'whether, under all the circumstances surrounding an encounter, a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate
the encounter."' Id. citing State v. Reese, 132 ldaho 652, 654, 978 P.2d 212, 214
(1999). An individual "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable,
objective grounds for doing so." Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
In State v. Page, an officer approached the defendant while he was on a public
street to ask a few questions and examined his identification, running it through dispatch
to check for warrants. Page, 140 ldaho at 844, 103 P.3d at 457. The ldaho Supreme
Court found that although the officer was justified in stopping the defendant to ask a few
questions, he unlawfully detained the defendant when the officer obtained his drivers

Id. The Court also noted the difference

license and ran it to check for warrants.

9

between obtaining a driver's license from a person operating a vehicle, who is statutorily
required to have a license and give it to police if asked, and identification obtained from
a pedestrian. Id. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458. The Court stated "[tlhe request for the
license and action in running it through dispatch must be reasonable under the
circumstances." Id.
Here, Ms. Swindle was escorted to the living room by the deputies and when she
asked if she could go to the bathroom to get a band-aid for her finger, she was advised
she could not. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.42, Ls.8-20; R., p.109.) Deputy Meehan also asked for
and obtained identification from Ms. Swindle, as well as the other individuals present,
while Deputy Sciortino was searching the residence.

(Tr. 6/15/07, p.21, Ls.14-22;

R., p.109; Exhibits A & B.) Deputy Meehan could not remember if he returned the
identification after ascertaining who everyone was. (R., p.109.) In the audio recordings
of the incident, a cell phone is also repeatedly ringing in the background and no one is
allowed to answer it. (Exhibits A & B.) The facts that Ms. Swindle was escorted from
the room she was in to another room, was not allowed to leave that room to go about
her business, and her identification was taken from her after she was escorted to the
living room, demonstrates that a reasonabie person would not feel free to leave under
the circumstances. Therefore, the district court correctly found that Ms. Swindle was
detained by the deputies.
2.

Ms. Swindle's Detention Was Unlawful Because The Deputies Did Not
Have A Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That She Was Involved In
Criminal Activity

The district court erred when it found that the deputies had a reasonable
suspicion that Ms. Swindle had committed or was about to commit a crime when they

detained her; therefore, her detention was illegal. "In order to satisfy constitutional
standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion on the part
of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person to be seized has
committed or is about to commit a crime." State v. Sevy, 129 ldaho 613, 615, 930 P.2d
1358, 1360 (Ct. App. 1997). An officer can only seize a person for the purposes of an
investigatory detention if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Knapp, 120 ldaho at 346-347, 815 P.2d at 1085.
When determining whether an investigatory detention is unconstitutional, the
courts will look at the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe that the person detained has committed or is about to
commit a crime. State
2003.)

V.

Bromgard, 139 ldaho 375, 379, 79 P.3d 734, 738 (Ct. App.

However, the officers' suspicion must be more than a hunch.

State v.

Schumacher, 136 ldaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, 11 (2001). "'Based upon the whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."'

Wilson v. ldaho

Transportation Department, 136 ldaho 270, 274, 32 P.3d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411,417-418 (1981)).
Here, the district court erred in finding that there was reasonable suspicion to
detain Ms. Swindle because they did not have an individualized, particularized suspicion
that she was involved in criminal activity. Furthermore, even if a generalized suspicion
related to the home was sufficient, the information provided by the known citizens failed
to provide that reasonable suspicion.

a.

The Deputies Lacked An Individualized Suspicion Specifically
Related To Ms. Swindle To Justifv Her Detention

Much of the deputies' suspicions in this case came from the information provided
by the citizen informants and was related strictly to the residence in general, rather than
specifically to Ms. Swindle. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.27, L.19 - p.28, L.1, p.45, L.3 - p.46, L . l l ;
R., pp.112, 114.) The United States Supreme Court has stated that a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment "must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's
legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis
added). The Brown Court went on to note "we have required the officers to have a
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity." Id. See also U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding brief
questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints absent an individualized
suspicion, as detentions are carried out pursuant to a routine plan with explicit and
neutral guidelines). Although the courts have allowed the occupants of a home who are
present when a search warrant is being executed to be detained during the search,
these holdings have still recognized that an individualized suspicion is required, finding
that the individualized suspicion to detain the occupants comes from the detached
judicial officer's finding of probable cause to search the residence.

Michigan v.

Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (198-l); Stafe v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App.
2002).
In Summers, the United States Supreme Court was asked whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated when officers stopped an individual who was exiting a

residence where they were about to execute a search warrant for narcotics. Id. at 693.
The Court held that, "for Fourth Amendment purposes . . . a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Id. at 705
(emphasis added). In that case, the owner of the home that was subject to a valid
search warrant, was leaving the home when officers arrived and was detained by the
officers while the search was conducted. Id. at 693. In reaching its decision, the
Supreme Court emphasized that:
Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police
had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for contraband. A
neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe
that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a
substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there.

Id. at 701 (emphasis added). In other words, the finding of probable cause to search
the home, by a neutral and detached magistrate, implicitly carried with it, the authority to
detain the owner of the home during the course of the search. This statement is also
consistent with the Supreme Court's concern in Brown, that when balancing the public's
interests with the individual's right to be free from unlawful seizures, the court's must
"assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Brown, 443 U.S. at
50-51.
Similarly, in State v. Kester, 137 ldaho 643, 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App. 2002), the
ldaho Court of Appeals "recognize[d] that the articulable and individualized suspicion to
support the detention is found in the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer
based upon probable cause." Id. Following the rationale of Michigan v. Summers, 452

U.S. 692 (1981), and the California Supreme Court opinion in People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.
4th 354, 902 P.2d 729 (Cai. 1995), the Kester Court held the officers in that case were
justified in stopping a person approaching a house where a search warrant was being
executed to identify the person and his connection to the premises being searched. Id.
In Glaser, the California Supreme Court was similarly asked whether a police
officer searching a private home pursuant to a search warrant, may briefly detain a
person who enters onto the premises at the same time as officers are beginning the
search. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th at 359. Relying on Summers, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the officer's brief detention of the defendant, who appeared to be more
than a stranger or casual visitor of the residence, was justified to determine the
defendant's identity and his connection to the residence. Id. at 365.
The instant case is distinguishable from Kester, Summers, and Glasser. The
officers were not executing a "search warrant," but instead were conducting a search of
pursuant to the homeowner's consent. A detached judicial officer had not made a
determination of probable cause to search the residence. Therefore, there was no
articulable and individualized suspicion to support Ms. Swindle's detention based on the
citizens' generalized complaints regarding Ms. Bear's residence. The neighbors also
did not give a description of anyone matching Ms. Swindle's being involved in any drug
activity at the residence. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.19, Ls.19-22.) Therefore, the generalized
complaints by the citizens could not provide an individualized suspicion that
Ms. Swindle was involved in criminal activity.
Although the district court also found that the reasonableness of the deputies
suspicions were enhanced by Deputy Sciortino's finding the other woman hiding in the

bedroom, believing Ms. Swindle lied about her presence, and by Ms. Swindle
requesting to go to the bathroom to get a band-aid for her finger, these findings do not
amount to an objectively reasonable suspicion that Ms. Swindle was involved in criminal
activity. (R. p p l 114.) Ms. Swindle was already being taken from the room she
was in to the living room when the other woman was found, and Ms. Swindle was
detained in the living room when she asked to go to the restroom. Additionally, not
knowing or mentioning where someone else is located and requesting to go to the
bathroom to get a band aid, even if it is not warranted, does not provide a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Finally, all of the individuals present in the home
were detained while officers conducted the search; consequently, the suggestion that
Ms. Swindle herself was deemed suspicious soiey because of her behavior, is
contradicted by the deputies' conduct in detaining everyone while searching the home.
Therefore, the officers did not possess a particularized suspicion related specifically to
Ms. Swindle that she was involved in criminal activity.
b.

The State Failed To Establish That The Information Provided By
The Citizen Informants Provided Reasonable Suspicion

Assuming arguendo that the generalized suspicions officers obtained from the
citizen informants could be imputed to Ms. Swindle as a visitor, the information still did
not provide a reasonable articulable suspicion criminal activity was afoot. When officers
receive information "from a known citizen informant rather than an anonymous tipster,
the citizen's disclosure of her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the
allegations turn out to be fabricated is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and
reliability." Wilson, 136 ldaho at 274, 32 P.3d at 168; Larson, 135 ldaho at 101, 15 P.3d

at 336. In some instances, an informant's tip may not warrant police response or may
require further investigation before an investigatory stop would be authorized. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). The more specific the information received, the
greater the weight to be given the information. Wilson, 136 ldaho at 275, 32 P.3d at
169. Whether the information provided is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion by
itself depends on both the reliability and the content of the information presented.
Sfafe v. Zapafa-Reyes, 144 ldaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291, 296 (2007).
At the suppression hearing, the deputies testified that the neighbors were
concerned about drug activity in part because of the amount of traffic at the trailer.
(Tr. 6/15/07, p.19, Ls.13-18.) However, the only information provided at the hearing to
support this claim was that there was a lot of traffic at the home and that the prior
morning someone knocked on one of the neighbor's doors asking for drugs.
(Tr. 6/15/07, p.45, Ls.3-14.) This last statement was never linked specifically to Ms.
Bear's home. There was never any testimony that the individuals knocking on the door,
then went to Ms. Bear's residence or asked for Ms. Bear. (Tr. 6/15/07, p.45, Ls.3-14.)
Additionally, high traffic at a residence can be attributed to other causes and does not
by itself provide a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Therefore, the information
provided by the citizen informants was not specific enough to provide a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity without further investigation.
D.

The Statements And Evidence Obtained As A Result Of Ms. Swindle's
Unlawful Detention Should Be Suppressed Because Thev Are The Fruits Of
Her Illegal Detention
Any evidence seized, including statements made, during the illegal detention of

Ms. Swindle, and subsequent arrest, should be excluded because they are the fruits of

her illegal detention. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence, obtained
either directly or indirectly from an unlawful search or seizure against the defendant.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1963); State v. Schrecengost, 134
ldaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). However, evidence will not be
excluded if the causal connection between the police action and the acquisition of the
evidence has been broken, and therefore, the evidence was not obtained through the
exploitation of the initial illegality. Schrecengost, 134 ldaho at 549, 6 P.3d at 406. Here
Ms. Swindle contends this causal connection between the illegal detention, her
statements and the subsequent seizure of evidence was not broken; therefore, her
statements and evidence seized should be suppressed.
In Florida v. Royer, the United States Supreme Court suppressed the
subsequent search of the defendant's bags despite his consent, because the consent
had been given during an illegal detention and was tainted by the illegality. Royer, 460
U.S. at 507-08; see also State v. Kerley, 134 ldaho 870, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000).
The Court found that evidence and statements obtained as a result of an illegal
detention by police is not admissible even if the statements and evidence are freely
given to police because they are not the product of "an independent act of free will."
Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. Here Ms. Swindle was being illegally detained when she was
approached and questioned about the bindle in bathroom. Therefore, her statements
that the bindle belonged to her, as well as any other statements made during this time,
should be suppressed. Additionally, her arrest, the search incident to her arrest, and
the statements made during her arrest and subsequent search directly resulted from her

statement that the bindle belonged to her and should have been suppressed as a fruit of
her illegal detention.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Swindle respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment and commitment order and order placing her on probation and reverse the
order denying her Motion to Suppress.
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